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away from extreme decisions: that is, investors who take regret into account hold less 
stock if the risk premium is high, but more stocks if the risk premium is low. Further, a 
rate of return guarantee provided at no cost to the plan participant induces him to hold 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The last two decades have wrought unprecedented change in the form and structure of
pensions around the world. In the past, many large corporations traditionally oﬀered deﬁned
beneﬁt (DB) plans where the plan sponsor promised workers a speciﬁed annuity beneﬁtf o r
the length of the retirement period. In such plans, the employer took on asset management
responsibility and paid beneﬁts according to pre-set formulas. Over time, however, many of
these DB plans were converted into deﬁned contribution (DC) pensions, where employees
rather than their employers would now have to decide how much to save and what to invest
in. The United States is a case in point, where there are now more DC plans, and more
DC-covered workers, than DB plans and covered workers. The DC movement has also spread
to the public sector, and recently the US President has proposed that the Social Security
system be adjusted to include a DC component (Cogan and Mitchell, 2003).
Though the popularity of the DC model continues to grow, capital market volatility of late
has redirected attention to the types of risks confronting DC plan participants. Some analysts
have argued that employee protection requires controlling DC asset allocation, forcing partic-
ipants to hold mainly corporate and government securities (Palacios, forthcoming). Others
have suggested that guarantees might be developed for investors with personal retirement
accounts (PRAs), on the notion that plan participants would like investment products that
would protect them against down-side ﬂuctuations in their assets (Lachance and Mitchell,
forthcoming). Indeed, Germany and Japan have recently mandated that participants in DC
pensions be promised a principal-guaranteed account at retirement, on the grounds that
this will make PRAs more attractive to participants who are not particularly ﬁnancially
sophisticated (Maurer and Schlag, forthcoming).
Of course, DC plan guarantees are not free, so it is important to assess how consumers
would adjust their investment portfolios if they were provided. Next, it would be useful to
know how participants would value guarantees in PRAs. Our analysis takes into account
the possibility that investors may be inﬂuenced by the prospect of regret. If, for example,
the return on the risky asset turns out to be very high when the worker retires, he may
2regret not having allocated a large enough portion of his contributions to the risky asset.
On the contrary, if the stock market does poorly, the retiree might regret having invested
at all in that asset. This anticipated disutility from regret could be particularly inﬂuential
in the context of contributions to a PRA, since most retirement plan participants appear to
select an initial asset allocation when they join the plan but do not actively manage their
retirement accounts thereafter.1
In what follows, we ﬁrst evaluate the impact of regret on the decision to allocate one’s
retirement account between a risk-free and a risky asset. We then examine how participants
adjust their optimal portfolio allocations if they are oﬀered a guarantee on the risky asset’s
return. Last, we analyze the impact of regret aversion on the participant’s willingness to pay
(WTP) for the guarantee.
Our results show that, without a guarantee, regret moves investors’ decisions away from
the extremes. That is, investors who take regret into account hold more stock if the risk
premium is low, but less stock if the risk premium is high. This result may help explain the
equity premium puzzle. Further, a rate of return guarantee provided at no cost to the plan
participant induces him to hold more stock, with or without regret. At high risk premiums,
the guarantee therefore induces decisions by regret-averse investors that are close to the ones
of risk-averse investors. On the contrary, at low risk premiums, guarantees move regret-
averse investors even further away from investing all in bonds. We also show that, with or
without regret, investors’ WTP for a guarantee rises with the level of the guaranteed return.
Prior Studies
A range of pension guarantee mechanisms might be contemplated for PRAs, though
typically they take the form of either a rate of return guarantee or a minimum beneﬁt
guarantee. In the present paper, we focus on the former structure, wherein the pension
manager commits to return to the worker his or her contributions plus some stipulated
1Agnew et al (2003), in a study of 401k plan participants, report that the vast majority (87 percent) of participants had no
annual trades; over a four year period, only a single trade took place per participant. Similarly, Ameriks and Zeldes (2000) show
that almost half of all TIAA-CREF participants made no changes in their asset allocations at all during the decade 1987-96.
3rate of return. A variation on this would, of course, be a principal guarantee, which is
simply equivalent to guaranteeing a nominal rate of return of zero percent. This latter
approach has been adopted in DC plans for both Germany and Japan. By contrast, Feldstein
and Samwick (2001) have suggested a more generous alternative for the US, namely a real
principal guarantee, and a more generous plan still might oﬀer some positive real return.
For example, employees might seek a plan that paid back contributions plus the 10-year
Treasury bond return.
Naturally, as prior studies have shown, the cost of providing such a guarantee will depend
in part on key design features. First, it matters how often the promise must be kept. For
example, it might be suﬃcient to structure the program so that the minimum return is
evaluated only at the worker’s retirement date. Alternatively, a more frequent minimum
return bar could be set, as in Chile, where pension plans must meet an annual threshold, or
in Colombia, where three-year periods are used (Pennachi, 1999; Fischer, 1999).
An additional design factor shaping the cost of the pension guarantee has to do with how
much investment risk may be borne by the investor in the PRA. Participants could make
the guarantee more valuable, and hence costlier, if they have the chance to invest in riskier
assets in their PRA portfolios. This moral hazard problem has been recognized by Bodie
and Merton (1993) and Smetters (2002), among others, and it has led many countries to
impose portfolio restrictions on investors’ asset allocations in deﬁned contribution plans. For
instance, Mexico until recently mandated that participants had to hold an all-bond portfolio,
and Chile initially required the same. Alternatively, governments may want to oﬀer workers
in PRAs some protection from market ﬂuctuations without mandating a risk-free portfolio.
This can be accomplished by providing a guaranteed return on the risky asset. Our goal is to
examine investment behavior in PRA plans in light of rate of return guarantees, introducing
the notion of regret aversion in that context.
2 The Impact of Regret on Portfolio Allocation
In this section, we examine investment behavior in a PRA setting. We start with the standard
4portfolio problem of risk-averse investor, and then we compare his optimal portfolio allocation
with the optimum selected by a regret-averse investor.
2.1 Risk-Averse Investor
Suppose an investor has initial wealth w0 which he can allocate between a risky and risk-free
asset. The return of the risky asset is given by a random variable R which is distributed
according to some cumulative distribution function F whereas the risk-free asset yields a
deterministic return rf. We assume that the investor’s preferences can be characterized
by a utility function u(·) with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0. In other words, he allocates his wealth
between the two assets to maximize his expected utility of ﬁnal wealth. The optimal fraction
α∗ invested in the risky asset is thus determined by the following maximization problem
max
α∈[0,1]
E [u(w0 (α(1 + R)+( 1− α)(1+rf)))] (1)
= E [u(w0 (1 + αR +( 1− α)rf))].
In other words, the optimal asset mix in the PRA is a function of his initial wealth level,
the size of the risk premium, and preferences. This is the standard portfolio problem and
the following proposition states the well-known result that a risk-averse investor invests a
positive fraction of his wealth in the risky asset as long as its expected return exceeds the
risk-free rate of return (see e.g. Chapter 4, Gollier, 2001).
Proposition 1 If E [R] − rf ≤ 0 then the investor allocates all his wealth to the risk-free
asset, i.e. α∗ =0 .I f E [R]−rf ≥
Cov(−R,u0(w0(1+R)))
E[u0(w0(1+R))] then the investor allocates all his wealth
to the risky asset, i.e. α∗ =1 .
Proof. Let w(α)=w0 (1 + αR +( 1− α)rf) denote the ﬁnal level of wealth as a function
of fraction α invested into the risky asset. The ﬁrst- and second-order conditions of the
5investor’s optimization problem (1) are
dE [u(w(α))]
dα
= E [w0 (R − rf)u











< 0.( 3 )
As expected utility is a strictly concave function in α any solution α∗ (0,0) of (2) will deter-
mine the unique global maximum. Evaluating the ﬁrst derivative at α =0and α =1will
determine conditions under which those corner solutions are obtained.
dE [u(w(α))]
dα
|α=0 = E [w0 (R − rf)u
0 (w0 (1 + rf))]
= w0u
0 (w0 (1 + rf))(E [R] − rf).
On the other hand, if E [R] ≤ rf then
dE[u(w(α))]
dα |α=0 ≤ 0, and concavity implies the corner
solution α∗ =0 .T h i si sb e c a u s e
dE [u(w(α))]
dα
|α=1 = E [w0 (R − rf)u
0 (w0 (1 + R))]
= w0 (Cov(R,u
0 (w0 (1 + R))) + (E [R] − rf)E [u
0 (w0 (1 + R))]).
If
rf ≤ E [R] −
Cov(−R,u0 (w0 (1 + R)))
E [u0 (w0 (1 + R))]
where Cov(−R,u0 (w0 (1 + R))) > 0 then
dE[u(w(α))]
dα |α=1 ≥ 0 and concavity implies the
corner solution α∗ =1 .
What this shows is that without a guarantee, the risk-averse investor holds all bonds
when the risk premium is nonpositive, but all stock when it is suﬃciently high.
62.2 Regret-Averse Investor
Now suppose an investor takes into account the fact that he may regret having made an
investment decision that proved to be suboptimal ex-post. For example, if the return on the
risky asset turns out to be very high, the investor might regret not having allocated his total
wealth to the risky asset. And in the contrary case, if the return of the risky asset turns
out to be very low or negative, the investor might regret having allocated any wealth to the
risky asset at all. To examine the impact of regret on the participant’s ex-ante allocation of
wealth and how it inﬂuences his demand for a guarantee, we follow the approach of Braun
and Muermann (2003) to pose the investor’s prefe r e n c e sa sat w o - a t t r i b u t eB e r n o u l l iu t i l i t y
function
uk (w)=u(w) − k · g(u(w
max) − u(w)).
Here wmax is the ex-post optimal level of ﬁnal wealth, i.e. the level of wealth that results
from the optimal ex-ante allocation had the investor known the realized return of the risky
asset. The ﬁrst attribute accounts for risk aversion and is characterized by the investor’s
utility function u(·) with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0. The second attribute relates to the fact that the
investor is regret-averse. The function g(·) m e a s u r e st h ea m o u n to fr e g r e tt h a tt h ei n v e s t o r
experiences, which depends on the diﬀerence between the value he assigns to the ex-post
optimal level of wealth wmax that he could have achieved, and the value that he assigns to
his actual ﬁnal level of wealth w. k>0 measures the importance of the second attribute
“regret” relative to the traditional ﬁrst attribute expressive of risk aversion. We assume that
g(·) is increasing and strictly convex, i.e. g0 > 0 and g00 > 0.F o rk =0 , the investor would
simply be a traditional expected utility maximizer, i.e. u0 (w)=u(w).
T od e t e r m i n et h ee x - p o s to p t i m a ll e v e lo fﬁnal wealth wmax for this investor, we must
distinguish cases when the risky asset’s realized return r ≥ rf,a n da l s ow h e nr<r f.I nt h e
ﬁrst case, the regret-averse investor would have wanted to invest all wealth in the risky asset,







w0 (1 + r)





We now compare how anticipation of regret inﬂuences the investor’s optimal asset alloca-
tion. Let α∗
k denote the optimal fraction invested in the risky asset by an investor with regret
parameter k ≥ 0 with α∗
0 = α∗. The following proposition shows that a regret-averse investor
will always “hedge away from the extremes”. In other words, compared to a traditional
risk-averse investor, he will select a riskier portfolio allocation if the risk premium is low,
and a more moderate portfolio allocation if the risk premium is high.
Proposition 2 If E [R] −rf =0then α∗
k > 0 for all k>0 whereas α∗
0 =0 .I fE [R] −rf =
Cov(−R,u0(w0(1+R)))
E[u0(w0(1+R))] then α∗
k < 1 for all k>0 whereas α∗
0 =1 .
Proof. The investor’s optimization program is
max
α∈[0,1]
E [uk (w(α))] (4)
= E [u(w(α)) − k · g(u(w
max) − u(w(α)))],
where w(α)=w0 (1 + αR +( 1− α)rf) and wmax = w0 (1 + max(r,rf)) denote the in-
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As E [uk (w(α))] is strictly concave in α,a n ys o l u t i o no f(5) determines the unique global




0 (w0 (1 + rf))E [(R − rf)(1+kg
0 (u(w
max) − u(w0 (1 + rf))))]
= w0u
0 (w0 (1 + rf))kE[(R − rf)g
0 (u(w
max) − u(w0 (1 + rf)))]
>w 0u
0 (w0 (1 + rf))kg
0 (0)(E [R] − rf)
=0
where the FOC (2) is applied to the second equality. The optimal fraction invested in
the risky asset is thus strictly positive, i.e. α∗
k > 0 for all k>0.N o w s u p p o s e E [R] −
rf =
Cov(−R,u0(w0(1+R)))
E[u0(w0(1+R))] . Evaluating the ﬁrst derivative at α =1yields
dE [uk (w(α))]
dα
|α=1 = E [w0 (R − rf)u
0 (w0 (1 + R))(1 + kg
0 (u(w
max) − u(w0 (1 + R))))]
= k · E [w0 (R − rf)u
0 (w0 (1 + R))g
0 (u(w
max) − u(w0 (1 + R)))]
w h e r ew ea p p l i e dt h eF O C(2). For realizations of the risky asset’s return r ≥ rf, wmax =
w0 (1 + R) and thus g0 (u(wmax) − u(w0 (1 + R))) = g0 (0). For realizations r<r f, wmax =
9w0 (1 + rf) and thus g0 (u(wmax) − u(w0 (1 + R))) >g 0 (0).T h e r e f o r e
dE [uk (w(α))]
dα
|α=1 <k w 0g
0 (0)E [(R − rf)u
0 (w0 (1 + R))]
=0 ,
as E [R]−rf =
Cov(−R,u
0(w0(1+R)))
E[u0(w0(1+R))] . Consequently, it is not optimal for the regret-averse investor
to hold all of his initial wealth in the risky asset (i.e. α∗
k < 1 for all k>0).
This may be explained intuitively by noting that taking an extreme position, e.g. all
bonds, exposes the investor to the possibility of facing extreme regret if stocks do well. By
avoiding all bonds, the worker will feel less regret if stocks do well but, in return, he will feel
some regret if they do poorly. Convexity of g, however, leads to suboptimality of extreme
decisions.
In the following proposition, we show that higher regret ampliﬁes the eﬀect of “hedging
one’s bet”.
Proposition 3 If the investor weights regret more strongly relative to risk aversion - as
measured by k - then for E [R] − rf ≤ 0 he invests more in the risky asset, whereas for
E [R] − rf ≥
Cov(−R,u0(w0(1+R)))
E[u0(w0(1+R))] he invests less in the risky asset, i.e.
∂α∗
k
∂k > 0 if E [R] − rf ≤ 0
∂α∗
k




Proof. Taking the total diﬀerential of the ﬁrst-order condition (5) with respect to α and k
leads to
∂2E [uk (w(α))]

















































From the FOC (5) we imply
kE[w0 (R − rf)u0 (w(α∗
k))g0 (u(wmax) − u(w(α∗










= −sign(E [w0 (R − rf)u0 (w(α∗
k))]).
If rf ≥ E [R], we know that E [w0 (R − rf)u0 (w(0))] = 0 from the FOC (2) and α∗
k > 0 from
Proposition 2. Concavity of u(·) then implies that E [w0 (R − rf)u0 (w(α∗








> 0. (7) shows that
∂α∗
k
∂k > 0. Analogously, if E [R]−rf ≥
Cov(−R,u0(w0(1+R)))
E[u0(w0(1+R))] ,
we know that E [w0 (R − rf)u0 (w(1))] = 0 from the FOC (2) and α∗
k < 1 from Proposition 2. Con-
cavity of u(·) then implies that E [w0 (R − rf)u0 (w(α∗












In other words, the more regret-averse the participant, the more likely he will be to hold
stock in his portfolio as long as the risk premium is low. Conversely, he will hold less stock
if the risk premium is high.
I nt h en e x tp r o p o s i t i o n ,w es h o wt h a tt h e r ee x ists a risk-free rate of return and therefore
a risk premium at which regret has no impact on the investor’s optimal fraction invested
in the risky asset. That is, a regret-averse investor holds the same portfolio allocation as a
risk-averse investor at that risk premium.






Proof. For any ﬁxed k>0 we have
α∗
k > 0 and α∗
0 =0 if E [R] − rf =0
α∗
k < 1 and α∗




Continuity thus implies that there exists E [R] −
Cov(−R,u0(w0(1+R)))
E[u0(w0(1+R))] < b rf (k) <E[R] such
that α∗
k = α∗




















lead to the condition








As this condition is independent of k we conclude that b rf (k)=b rf for all k ≥ 0.
In other words, for some intermediate risk premium, a regret-averse investor chooses a
portfolio allocation as if he did not consider regret.
We summarize our ﬁndings in Figure 1.
Remark 5 We would like to point out that our results may help explain the equity premium
puzzle as, at a high risk premiums, regret induces investors to select a less risky portfolio, as








Figure 1: Asset Allocation Without a Guarantee With a zero risk premium the risk-averse investor
would invest all of his wealth in the risk-free asset (α∗
0 =0 ). By contrast, the regret-averse investor would
place some of his wealth in the stock (α∗
k > 0). As the level of regret aversion rises, i.e. k2 >k 1, the amount
of wealth invested in the stock increases. With a relatively large risk premium, the risk-averse investor
allocates all of his wealth in stock (α∗
0 =1 ), while the regret-averse investor invests some money in the
risk-free asset (α∗
k < 1). As the level of regret aversion increases, with a high risk premium, the amount of
wealth invested in stock decreases.
133 The Impact of Guarantees on Portfolio Allocation
We now assume that a guaranteed return on the risky asset is provided at zero cost to
the investor.2 In this section, we show how the optimal asset allocation responds to the
guarantee, for a risk-averse versus a regret-averse investor.
Let rg ≥− 1 be the guaranteed return on the risky asset. The return of this contingent
contract is therefore Rg =m a x( R,rg). To exclude statewise dominance of the guaranteed
risky asset over the risk-free asset, we assume that rg <r f. The investor with regret
parameter k ≥ 0 selects a portfolio allocation αk (rg) to maximize his expected utility. Thus
the optimal fraction α∗
k (rg) invested in stocks solves the following problem
max
α∈[0,1]
E [uk (w0 (1 + αRg +( 1− α)rf))]
where uk (w)=u(w)−k·g(u(wmax) − u(w)). The optimal fraction invested in stocks with
no guarantee is thus α∗
k (−1) = α∗
k.
We note that the guarantee does not alter the ex-post optimal level of ﬁnal wealth wmax.
The ex-post optimal decision is to invest all in the risky asset if its realized return is above the
risk-free rate of return, and all in the risk-free asset if otherwise, i.e. wmax = w0 (1 + max(R,rf)).
3.1 Risk-Averse Investor
Proposition 6 α∗
0 (rg) ≥ α∗
0 (−1) for all −1 <r g <r f where equality holds if and only if
α∗
0 (−1) = 1.
Proof. Let w(rg,α)=w0 (1 + αRg +( 1− α)rf) denote the level of ﬁn a lw e a l t hw i t haf r a c t i o n
α invested into the risky asset with guaranteed return rg. Our benchmark of not having a
guarantee therefore yields a level of ﬁnal wealth w(−1,α)=w0 (1 + αR +( 1− α)rf). Evaluating
2We recognize that there is a cost of providing such a guarantee (see Lachance and Mitchell 2003), and further the cost may
rise if the investor is allowed to reoptimize his portfolio.






0(−1) = E [w0 (Rg − rf)u0 (w(rg,α ∗
0 (−1)))]




w0 (rg − R)
+ u0 (w(rg,α ∗
0 (−1)))
i
as Rg = R +( rg − R)
+. Further, for realizations r of the risky asset with r ≥ rf we have
Rg = R and thus w(rg,α ∗
0 (−1)) = w(−1,α ∗
0 (−1)). For realizations r<r f we have w(rg,α ∗
0 (−1)) >
w(−1,α ∗
0 (−1)) and therefore (R − rf)u0 (w(rg,α ∗










w0 (rg − R)










0(−1) > 0 then implies that α∗
0 (rg) >α ∗
0 (−1) as long as α∗
0 (−1) < 1.
For α∗
0 (−1) = 1 we get the corner solution α∗
0 (rg)=1 .
This shows that a risk-averse investor with a zero price guarantee generally follows a
riskier investment strategy than without a guarantee.
3.2 Regret-Averse Investor
Proposition 7 α∗
k (rg) ≥ α∗
k (−1) for all −1 <r g <r f, k>0 where equality holds if and
only if α∗
k (−1) = 1.
Proof. Analogous to the proof above, we evaluate the ﬁrst derivative of expected utility
15with respect α at α∗





= E [w0 (Rg − rf)u0 (w(rg,α ∗
k (−1)))(1 + kg0 (u(wmax) − u(w(rg,α ∗
k (−1)))))]
= E [w0 (R − rf)u0 (w(rg,α ∗




w0 (rg − R)
+ u0 (w(rg,α ∗




For realizations r of the risky asset with r ≥ rf we have Rg = R and thus w(rg,α ∗
k (−1)) =
w(−1,α ∗
k (−1)). For realizations r<r f we have w(rg,α ∗
0 (−1)) >w (−1,α ∗
0 (−1)) and therefore
u0 (w(rg,α ∗
k (−1))) <u 0 (w(−1,α ∗
k (−1))) and
g0 (u(wmax) − u(w(rg,α ∗
k (−1)))) <g 0 (u(wmax) − u(w(−1,α ∗
k (−1)))).
Hence
(R − rf)u0 (w(rg,α ∗
k (−1)))(1 + kg0 (u(wmax) − u(w(rg,α ∗
k (−1)))))
> (R − rf)u0 (w(−1,α ∗







>E [w(R − rf)u0 (w(−1,α ∗




w0 (rg − R)
+ u0 (w(rg,α ∗









k(−1) > 0 then implies that α∗
k (rg) >α ∗
k (−1) as long as α∗
k (−1) < 1.
For α∗
k (−1) = 1 we get the corner solution α∗
k (rg)=1 .
Analogous to the above, the regret-averse investor with a zero price guarantee invests a
16larger fraction of his wealth in stock than without a guarantee.
This proposition shows that a guarantee has an asymmetric impact on the eﬀect of regret
on portfolio allocation. At high risk premiums, the guarantee induces the regret-averse
investor to move towards the extreme decision of investing all in stock. At low risk premiums,
however, the guarantee induces the regret-averse investor to move further away from the
extreme decision of investing all in the risk-free asset. Intuitively, this derives from the fact
that a guaranteed rate of return provides a lower ﬂoor on the risky asset’s return. The
guarantee thus diminishes the disutility that results from regret the investor experiences
at high risk premiums given low realizations of the risky asset’s return. The regret-averse
investor then invests more in the risky asset if he is endowed with the guarantee, and his
portfolio allocation looks “more similar” to the one of a pure risk-averse investor. At low
risk premiums, however, regret is derived mostly from high realizations of the risky-asset’s
return, and the guarantee has only a small impact on the disutility derived from regret. The
regret-averse investor thus invests even more in the risky asset.
We summarize our results in Figure 2.
4 Willingness To Pay for Return Guarantees
In the previous section, guarantees were assumed to be oﬀered at zero price, and investors
were permitted to reallocate their portfolios accordingly. As we showed above, this will
frequently induce the investor to hold more stocks in their pension portfolio which in turn
increases the cost of providing such protection. In this section, we ﬁx the investor’s portfolio
allocation to mitigate this moral hazard problem. Under this condition, we analyze the
investor’s WTP for the guarantee.
Let Pk (rg, ¯ α) denote the maximum price the investor with regret parameter k ≥ 0 is








Figure 2: Asset Allocation With a Guarantee With a guarantee (α∗(rg)) and zero risk premium, a risk-
averse investor (k =0 ) will invest more wealth into the stock (α∗
0(rg)) and so will a regret-averse investor
(α∗
k(rg)). With a higher risk premium, the risk-averse investor will invest all his wealth into the stock with
a guarantee and a regret-averse investor will increase his investment into the risky asset. Therefore, at a
signiﬁcantly high risk premium, with a guarantee on the risky asset, regret causes the investor to behave
more like the risk-averse investor.
18WTP Pk (rg, ¯ α) is thus determined by
E [uk ((w0 (1 + ¯ αR +( 1− ¯ α)rf)))] = E [uk ((w0 − Pk (rg, ¯ α))(1 + ¯ αRg +( 1− ¯ α)rf))],( 8 )
i.e.




w0 − Pk (rg, ¯ α)
w0
· w(rg, ¯ α)
¶¸
where uk (w)=u(w) − k · g(u(wmax) − u(w)) and w(rg,α)=w0 (1 + αRg +( 1− α)rf).
Obviously, if no guarantee is provided (rg = −1) the investor’s WTP is zero (Pk (−1, ¯ α)=0
for all 0 ≤ ¯ α ≤ 1). In addition, if the investor’s wealth is ﬁxed to be all in bonds, his WTP
for the stock guarantee is zero (Pk (rg,0) = 0 for all −1 ≤ rg ≤ rf).
As mentioned before, the guarantee does not alter the ex-post optimal level of ﬁnal wealth
wmax. Ex-post, therefore, it is always suboptimal to have bought a guaranteed rate of return.
Ex-ante, one might nevertheless buy a guarantee to diminish the disutility derived from
ex-post regret.
4.1 Risk-Averse Investor
The following proposition establishes comparative statics of the WTP with respect to the






g < 0 for all 0 < ¯ α ≤ 1.F o r¯ α =0 , P (rg,0) = 0.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating (8) twice with respect to rg implies
0=E
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This implies that the WTP P0 (rg, ¯ α) is increasing and concave in the fraction ¯ α invested in
the risky stock for all 0 < ¯ α ≤ 1.
Two implications ﬂow from this analysis. First, an investor holding some risky asset is
willing to pay a strictly positive amount for a guarantee. In other words, since P (−1, ¯ α)=0
(this represents no guarantee), then
∂P0(rg,¯ α)
∂rg > 0 implies P0 (rg, ¯ α) > 0 for all 0 < ¯ α ≤ 1 and
−1 <r g <r f. This conforms with intuition, since risk-averse investors would be expected
to want to pay something for lower variability in returns. For ¯ α =0 , i.e. the investor holds
only risk-free assets, his WTP for a guarantee is zero. Second, the WTP increases with the
level of the guaranteed return rg, but at a decreasing rate.
4.2 Regret-Averse Investor
A n a l o g o u st oa b o v e ,w ed e r i v et h ec o m p a r a t i v es t a t i c so ft h eW T Pw i t hr e s p e c tt ot h e






g < 0 for all 0 < ¯ α ≤ 1, k ≥ 0.F o r ¯ α =0 ,
Pk (rg,0) = 0 for all k ≥ 0.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating (8) twice with respect to rg implies
0=E
·µ
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Just as before, with the risk-averse investor, the regret-averse investor’s WTP Pk (rg, ¯ α) is
increasing and concave in the fraction ¯ α invested in the risky stock for all 0 < ¯ α ≤ 1.F o r
¯ α =0his WTP is zero.
As before, a regret-averse investor holding some risky asset is willing to pay a strictly
positive amount for a guarantee, even though it is never optimal ex-post to have bought the
guarantee.
5 Conclusions and Future Research
This paper explores how the consideration of regret inﬂuences investors’ portfolio allocation
in a PRA. We also examine how participant portfolio choices would change if a rate of return
guarantee on risky assets were provided at zero cost. Finally, we assess how much investors
might be willing to pay for such a guarantee for a ﬁxed portfolio allocation.
Our results show that, without a guarantee, regret moves investors’ decisions away from
22the extremes. That is, investors who take regret into account hold more stock if the risk
premium is low, but less stock if the risk premium is high. This result may explain the
equity premium puzzle. Further, a rate of return guarantee provided at no cost to the plan
participant induces him to hold more stock, with or without regret. At high risk premiums,
the guarantee therefore induces decisions by regret-averse investors that are close to the ones
of risk-averse investors. On the contrary, at low risk premiums, guarantees move regret-
averse investors even further away from investing all in bonds. We also show that, with or
without regret, investors’ WTP for a guarantee rises with the level of the guaranteed return.
Extensions of this research would likely be fruitful. For example, we have assumed that
the guarantee is written on the portion of the portfolio invested in risky assets. Nevertheless,
in the real world, the guarantee might cover returns on the entire PRA portfolio, which in
our case would likely reduce the cost of the guarantee. Exactly how much people would
be willing to pay in this case could be examined in further analysis. We also would like to
investigate what happens if the fraction of the PRA invested in risky asset cannot be ﬁxed
ex-ante. In this case, it would be of interest to ask whether there is an incentive-compatible
contract which would still permit an attractive guarantee without being prohibitively expen-
sive. Finally, it would be useful to ascertain whether ﬁnancial intermediaries would ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to enter into the guaranteed pension business, or how much the government would
have to subsidize purchasers, so as to bring these products to market.
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